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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY-Attorneys Are Not Liable
to Their Clients' Adversaries: Garcia v. Rodey, Dickason, Sloan,
Akin & Robb, P.A.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Garcia v. Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A.,' the New

Mexico Supreme Court found that attorneys cannot be held liable to an
adverse party for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, violating the
former Code of Professional Responsibility or the Attorney's Oath, constructive fraud and promissory estoppel.2 Garcia was a case of first
impression in New Mexico. Therefore, the court based its decision on

the law of a majority of other jurisdictions that an attorney owes no
duty to a third party unless that third party is an intended beneficiary
of the attorney's actions. This note examines the cases upon which the
court based its decision, the court's application of these cases in Garcia,
Garcia's implications for future cases, Garcia's effect upon the public's
perception of the Bar, and the Bar's response to the public's perception.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
J. Placido Garcia was the Superintendent of the Socorro Consolidated
School District of New Mexico. 3 When his contract with the school
district expired, it was not renewed.4 Garcia filed a civil rights lawsuit
in the federal district court against the school board members in their
official and individual capacities. 5 The board members raised Eleventh
Amendment immunity6 and good faith immunity 7 defenses in their answer,
1. 106 N.M. 757, 750 P.2d 118 (1988) (hereafter "Garcia").
2. Id.
3. Garcia v. Bd. of Educ. of Socorro Consol. School Dist., 777 F.2d 1403, 1405 (10th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 814 (1986) (hereafter "Garcia v. Board").
4. Id.
5. Garcia, 106 N.M. at 759, 750 P.2d at 120. Garcia brought his claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983
(1982), which states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....
6. The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution reads: "The Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to arty suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI. "While the Amendment by its terms does not bar.
suits against a State by its own citizens, ... an unconsenting state is immune from suits brought
in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State." Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974) (citations omitted).
7. When public officials make improper decisions affecting a person's rights, good faith immunity
allows the officials to be excused from liability for their actions if the officials believed their acts
to be correct, and if a reasonable person would believe so, as well. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308 (1975). This is done so as not to burden officials by making them personally liable for their
good-faith mistakes. Id.
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first and second amended answers, and pretrial order. 8 However, the
board members did not pursue either defense at trial, and neither defense
was ruled upon. 9
During trial, the judge was concerned that explaining and distinguishing
the claims against the board members in their official capacities and
against the board members individually would confuse the jury. 0 He
recommended that Garcia drop his claims against the board members in
their individual capacities, thereby eliminating the board members' good
faith immunity defense." The board members' attorney was present but
did not participate in the discussion. 2 The next day, the court again
asked Garcia's attorney about dropping the claims. 3 Garcia's attorney
said he had discussed the matter with his client and co-counsel and that
they had agreed to drop the claims against the board members in their
individual capacities. 4 The board members' attorneys stated that they
did not object to this decision. 5
While discussing the final version of the jury instructions, the court
stated that the instructions only concerned the board members in their
official capacities. The court also mentioned that it assumed if the plaintiff
was entitled to a verdict, that verdict would be recoverable. 6 The board
members' attorney agreed.' 7 The attorney also agreed that the school
district would not claim "some kind of immunity or something" if the
plaintiff won. 8 When the court offered the parties a chance to preserve
the record, the defendants did not object to the court's failure to rule
on the Eleventh Amendment or good faith immunity defenses.' 9
The jury awarded Garcia $180,000 against the board members in their
official capacities.20 The board members appealed and raised the Eleventh
Amendment immunity defense for the first time since the pre-trial order. 2 '
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Eleventh Amendment
immunity may be raised for the first time on appeal because it is
jurisdictional.Y The court added, referring to the timeliness of the Eleventh
8. Garcia, 106 N.M. at 759, 750 P.2d at 120.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. The defense would be eliminated because it is only used by individual members of the
state body when they have been sued in their individual capacities. See supra note 7.
12. Garcia, 106 N.M. at 759, 750 P.2d at 120.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. United States District Court Judge Thomas R. Brett asked that "if the plaintiff were
recovering, then all at once the school district will not respond or claim some kind of immunity
or something." Id.
19. Garcia v. Board, 777 F.2d at 1406.
20. Garcia, 106 N.M. at 759, 750 P.2d at 120.
21. Id. at 759-60, 750 P.2d at 120-21.
22. Garcia v. Board, 777 F.2d at 1405 (citing Edelman, 415 U.S. at 677-78). Edelman stated
that "the Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar
so that it need not be raised in the trial court." Edelman, 415 U.S. at 677-78 (citing Ford Motor
Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 466-67 (1945)). A successful claim of lack of
jurisdiction means that no court may hear the merits of the action, such as in this case. U.S.
CONST. art. II, §2, cl. I.
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Amendment immunity defense, "[w]e sympathize with the trial court and
the plaintiff when they have been 'sand bagged' as they were on this
issue."23
After finding that the board could raise the immunity issue, the court
looked at whether the board's attorney had waived the immunity. The
court held that, because Eleventh Amendment immunity may only be
waived by the state, the board's attorney could not waive it without
state authorization.,t New Mexico has waived its sovereign immunity only
for certain claims brought under the Tort Claims Act.25 Garcia's claims
arose under the Civil Rights Act of 1871,26 not the New Mexico Tort
Claims Act. The Tenth Circuit further held that school boards are considered arms of the state and are protected by Eleventh Amendment
immunity, thereby relieving 27the board of liability and leaving Garcia no
recourse against the board.
Garcia then sued the board members' attorneys and the attorneys' law
firm. He alleged that he would not have dropped his claim against the
board members in their individual capacities had he known his claims
would be barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.28 Because this immunity was successfully raised on appeal, Garcia claimed he was deprived
of his favorable jury verdict without any recourse.2 9 Garcia contended
that the attorneys' conduct "constituted a duty . . . to [Garcia] and was
not privileged." 3 0 He claimed that this breach of duty entitled him to
recover money damages for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Attorney's
Oath, constructive fraud, promissory estoppel, and breach of contract. 3'
The defendants moved to dismiss the claims for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.3 2 The court granted the motions,
and Garcia appealed to the New Mexico Supreme Court." However, he

23. Garcia v. Board, 777 F.2d at 1406. The Garcia court disagreed with the characterization of
the attorneys' actions as "sandbagging." Garcia, 106 N.M. at 760, 750 P.2d at 121. The court
noted that the board's attorneys had raised the Eleventh Amendment immunity issue in four separate
documents, and that "as the appellate court itself recognized, this defense can be raised at any
time regardless of whether the trial court addressed it." Id.
24. Garcia v. Board, 777 F.2d at 1407.
25. Id. The claims upon which the state may be sued are set forth in N.M. STAT. ANN. §§414-13 to -25 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
26. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1982).
27. Garcia v. Board, 777 F.2d at 1407.
28. Garcia, 106 N.M. at 760, 750 P.2d at 121. The Tenth Circuit went one step further and
stated that "the trial court might have reconsidered its recommendation that [Garcia] drop his claim
against the [board members] in their individual capacities." 777 F.2d at 1406.
29. Garcia, 106 N.M. at 760, 750 P.2d at 121.
30. Id. The court did not state the specific conduct of which Garcia complained. Presumably,
Garcia's complaint was with the fact that the board's attorney said that the board would not raise
immunity and later did.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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did not brief the breach of contract theory in the New Mexico appeal,
and it was deemed abandoned."
III.

LAWS OF NEW MEXICO AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS,
AND NEW MEXICO'S APPLICATION OF THOSE LAWS
IN GARCIA

The Garcia court first discussed the duty attorneys owe to their client's
adversaries. Because this was the first time the New Mexico Supreme
Court had addressed the issue, the court reviewed other jurisdictions'
decisions. Based upon these decisions, the court found that the board's
attorney owed no duty to Garcia and held that "an attorney cannot be
held liable on a cause of action in negligence to his client's adversary."3S
The court also found the lack of duty that defeated the negligence claim
barred Garcia's negligent misrepresentation, constructive fraud, and promissory estoppel claims.36 New Mexico courts hold that actions for negligent
misrepresentation, constructive fraud, and promissory estoppel require a
duty, or reasonable reliance based upon a duty, as an element necessary
for recovery. 7 The court further found, after reviewing the law of other
jurisdictions, that a breach of the Code of Professional Responsibility
or the Attorney's Oath does not give rise to a private cause of action
for damages against attorneys.3 8
A.

Negligence and an Attorney's Duty
The court focused on an attorney's duties to third parties in general.3 9
Because this was a case of first impression, the court reviewed other
jurisdictions to determine what duty is owed to an attorney's. adversary.4
From this review, the court
concluded that no duty is owed and dismissed
41
the negligence claim.
The general elements of negligence are: a duty to adhere to a certain
standard of conduct for the protection of others, a failure to perform
this duty, and a showing that the failure was the cause of injury.4 2
Whether a duty is owed is determined by the relationship of the parties
and whether policy considerations should protect one party from another's
conduct.4 3 When dealing with liability to third parties in a contractual
setting, privity of contract is no longer required to create a duty or to

34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id. at 761, 750 P.2d at 122.
Id. at 761-63, 750 P.2d at 122-24.
See infra, sections II.B. and II.C.

38. See infra section Il.D.
39. Garcia, 106 N.M. at 760-61, 750 P.2d at 121-22.
40. Id. at 761, 750 P.2d at 122.
41. Id.
42. Holland v. Lawless, 95 N.M. 490, 495, 623 P.2d 1004, 1009 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 95
N.M. 593, 624 P.2d 535 (1981).
43. Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1,7, 312 N.W.2d 585, 591 (1981) (citing W. PROSSER, TORTS
§53, at 324, 325-26 (4th ed. 1971)); Weaver v. Superior Court, County of Orange, 95 Cal. App.
3d 166, 179, 156 Cal. Rptr. 745, 751 (1979).
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sustain a negligence claim based upon the transactions giving rise to that
claim." Therefore, courts look to various policy considerations including
"the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff,
the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that he suffered
injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct
and the injury suffered, and the policy of preventing future harm.' '4S
An attorney's duty to a third party does not depend upon the existence
of an attorney-client relationship.4 The third party who claims that the
47
attorney owed him a duty need only show another basis for that duty.
This basis may exist if the third party was an intended beneficiary of
the attorney's conduct," if the harm to the third party was reasonably
foreseeable, 49 or if the third party foreseeably relied upon the advice.50
There may be a basis for the duty when an attorney negligently drafts
a will or examines a title." In these situations, a third party can recover.
However, when the thirdt party is the attorney's client's adversary, there
is no basis for a duty.
No jurisdiction has held that an attorney owes a duty of care to an
adverse party in litigation." An attorney is an advocate whose "paramount
and exclusive duty is to his client." 4 The duty to a client, among other
things, is to zealously assert the client's position.55 Attorneys have also

44. Holland, 95 N.M. at 496, 623 P.2d at 1010 (citing Steinberg v. Coda Roberson Constr.
Co., 79 N.M. 123, 440 P.2d 798 (1968) and Stotlar v. Hester, 92 N.M. 26, 582 P.2d 403 (Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 180, 585 P.2d 324 (1978)).
45. Wisdom v. Neal, 568 F. Supp. 4, 7 (D.N.M. 1982) (quoting Steinberg, 79 N.M. at 125,
440 P.2d at 798). See also Weaver, 95 Cal. App. 3d at 179, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 751 (adding that
the defendant's moral blameworthiness, the burden on the defendant or society if liability is imposed
or withheld, respectively, and the availability of insurance for the risk are factors to be weighed).
46. Wisdom, 568 F. Supp. at 8. In Wisdom, the attorneys for the decedent's estate distributed
the estate incorrectly. Id. at 5. The decedent's brothers and sisters filed suit against the attorneys
for legal malpractice. Id. The attorneys claimed that there was no attorney-client relationship. Id.
at 5-6. Citing Holland, the court explained that an attorney-client relationship need not exist for
an attorney to be liable for legal malpractice. Id. at 8.
47. Wisdom, 568 F. Supp. at 8.
48. Donald v. Garry, 19 Cal. App. 3d 769, 771, 97 Cal. Rptr. 191, 192 (1971); Brody v. Ruby,
267 N.W.2d 902, 906 (Iowa 1978).
49. Fox v. Pollack, 181 Cal. App. 3d 954, 961, 226 Cal. Rptr. 532, 535 (1986).
50. Friedman, 412 Mich. at 9, 312 N.W.2d at 593; Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 34243, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375, 380, 556 P.2d 737, 742 (1976).
51. Annotation, Attorney's Liability, to One Other Than His Immediate Client, for Consequences
of Negligence in Carrying Out Legal Duties, 45 A.L.R. 3d 1181 (1972); Garcia, 106 N.M. at 761,
750 P.2d at 122.
381 N.E.2d 1367, 1376 (1978), cert. denied,
52. See Berlin v. Nathan, 64 I1. App. 3d 940, -,
444 U.S. 828 (1979); Tappen v. Ager, 599 F.2d 376, 378 (10th Cir. 1979); Norton v. Hines, 49
Cal. App. 3d 917, 921, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237, 240 (1975) (adverse party not being an intended
beneficiary of attorney's actions); Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1381 (N.D. Iowa), aff'd,
590 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1978) (opposing party cannot reasonably rely on opposing counsel).
53. See generally Bickel, 447 F. Supp. at 1381; Tappen, 599 F.2d at 378, 379; Weaver, 95 Cal.
-,
381 N.E.2d at
App. 3d at 178, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 751. See also Berlin, 64 Ill. App. 3d at
1376 (no jurisdiction has found liability to third-party adversary without malicious prosecution).
54. Tappen, 599 F.2d at 378.
55. SUP. CT. Ru.as ANN. 16-101 (Preamble) (Repl. Pamp. 1988); see also Nelson v. Miller, 227
Kan. 271, -,
607 P.2d 438, 451 (1980) (quoting Norton, 49 Cal. App. 3d at 921-24, 123 Cal.
Rptr. at 240-41) (adding that an attorney may promote a client's interests in a manner as favorable
to the client's position as the law and ethics will permit).
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been called "quasi judicial officer[s] of the court, with a grave and heavy
responsibility in the administration of justice. 5' 6 Although courts may
hold other professionals liable for their negligence which affects third
parties, the adversary system sets attorneys apart from other professionals.17 If attorneys were liable for negligence to an adversary, attorneys
would be preoccupied with protecting themselves from their client's adversary, instead of vigorously pursuing the case for their client. 8 Liability
for negligence would also ruin the attorney's "value to the court" in
administering justice1 9
The conflict of interest that would arise from a duty to an adversary
would also impair the client's right to free access to the courts.6 The
policy of freedom of access to the courts may even outweigh any policy
against filing meritless actions'.6 Attorneys must have the same freedom
as their clients have to start lawsuits, or clients will not get their fair
day in court. 62 To make an attorney carry a heavier burden in initiating
lawsuits would make the attorney both a predictor and insurer of success
of a claim, making it likely that "only the rare
attorney would have the
'63
courage to take other than the 'easy' case."
After reviewing the cases from other jurisdictions concerning an attorney's duty, the Garcia court announced that as a matter of law, an
attorney has no duty to an adverse party." An attorney's only loyalties
are to the attorney's client and the legal system.65 Because of this exclusive
loyalty, an adverse party is obviously not an intended beneficiary of an

56. Brody, 267 N.W.2d at 907. See also Woodson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 102 N.M. 333,
339, 695 P.2d 483, 489 (1985) (attorneys "are officers of the court and are always under an
obligation to be truthful to the court") (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. Code Prof. Resp. R. 1-102(A)(3).
7-102(A)(5) (Repl. Pamp. 1982)).
57. Bickel, 447 F. Supp. at 1381; Friedman, 412 Mich. at 10, 312 N.W.2d at 594.
58. Goodman. 18 Cal. 3d at 344, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 381, 556 P.2d at 743.
59. Berlin, 64 Ill. App. 3d at -,
381 N.E.2d at 1376. The court stated that "liability only
for negligence, for the bringing of a weak case, would be to destroy [the lawyer's] efficacy as
advocate of his client and his value to the court, since only the rare attorney would have the
courage to take other than the 'easy' case." Id.
60. Friedman, 412 Mich. at 7-8, 312 N.W.2d at 591-92; Weaver, 95 Cal. App. 3d at 179, 156
Cal. Rptr. at 751-52.
61. See, e.g., Tappen, 599 F.2d at 378-79. Garcia cites nine cases that support this proposition.
Six of these were lawsuits by doctors who had completed a successful defense against malpractice
claims. These doctors brought suit against the attorneys who had prosecuted the malpractice claims.
Without discussing the merits of the malpractice claims, the courts in those six cases held that,
even if the malpractice claims were meritless, the policy of freedom of access to the courts outweighs
against filing meritless claims. Friedman, 412 Mich. at 4, 312 N.W.2d at 588; Weaver, 95 Cal.
App. 3d at 172-77, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 747-50; Spencer v. Burglass, 337 So. 2d 596, 598 (La. Ct.
App. 1976), cert. denied, 340 So. 2d 990 (La. 1977); Nelson, 227 Kan. at
. 607 P.2d
at 440-41; Brody, 267 N.W.2d at 903; Bickel. 447 F. Supp. at 1378. See also Berlin, 64 Ill. App.
3d at -,
381 N.E.2d at 1369; Tappen, 599 F.2d at 377 (doctors countersued while malpractice
action was pending). Courts are also unwilling to hold attorneys liable because this would encourage
retaliation suits, which doctors are using in an effort to reduce the number of meritless malpractice
claims brought against them. Bickel, 447 F. Supp. at 1384.
62. Weaver, 95 Cal. App. 3d at 180, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 752 (citing Norton, 49 Cal. App. 3d
at 923, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 241).
63. Berlin, 64 Ill. App. 3d at
-,
381 N.E.2d at 1376; Spencer, 337 So. 2d at 601.
64. Garcia, 106 N.M. at 761, 750 P.2d at 122.
65. Id.
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attorney's words and conduct.66 Neither can adverse parties justifiably
rely upon an opposing attorney's words or conduct to protect them from
harm.6 7 Therefore, an attorney owes no duty to his adversary and cannot
be liable for negligence.6 The court agreed with the proposition that a
duty to the adverse party would interfere with the attorney-client relationship and the client's interests. 69 Further, the court appears to commend
this freedom from liability so that each client will have an attorney who
is unafraid to bring an action and who will be a vigorous advocate. 70
B.

Negligent Misrepresentation in New Mexico
The court reviewed the New Mexico authorities, including the negligent
misrepresentation section of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 7I Finding
that duty was an element of negligent misrepresentation, the court held
that, as a matter of law, attorneys cannot be liable to their adversaries
72
for negligent misrepresentation
New Mexico has adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts as its law of
negligent misrepresentation.7 1 The Restatement states that a person who
gives information is liable for any loss that comes to a third party if
the person giving the information does not use care in getting or com-

66. Id.
67. Id. (citing Tappen, 599 F.2d at 379). In fact, the court noted that the attorneys did not
surprise Garcia with the Eleventh Amendment immunity defense because the attorneys raised it in
four previous documents of record. Garcia, 106 N.M. at 760, 750 P.2d at 121.
68. Garcia. 106 N.M. at 761, 750 P.2d at 122.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 761-62, 750 P.2d at 122-23 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §552 (1977)).
72. Id. at 762, 750 P.2d at 123.
73. Stotlar, 92 N.M. at 29, 582 P.2d at 406. The Restatement reads in pertinent part:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any
other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information
for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information,
if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating
the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1) is
limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and
guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends
to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to
influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar
transaction.
RESTATEMENT (SEcot)
OF TORTS §552 (1977). Comment (h) states:
[lit is not necessary that the maker should have any particular person in mind as
the intended, or even the probable, recipient of the information.... It is enough
that the maker of the representation intends it to reach and influence either a
particular person or persons, known to him, or a group or class of persons, distinct
from the much larger class who might reasonably be expected sooner or later to
have access to the information and foreseeably to take some action in reliance
upon it.
After Garcia was decided, New Mexico also adopted the Restatement's measure of damages for
negligent misrepresentation, which are out-of-pocket and reliance damages, but not expectation
damages. First Interstate Bank of Gallup v. Foutz, 107 N.M. 749, 751, 764 P.2d 1307, 1309 (1988).
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municating the information.7 4 Further, the person is liable if the third
party receiving the information expected7 to receive the information and

justifiably relied on it in a transaction.

New Mexico adopted the Restatement in Stotlar v. Hester.76 The Stotlar
court held that a party need not be in privity of contract with a third
party in order to be held liable to that third party for negligent misrepresentation. 77 However, absent fraud, succeeding on the claim requires
that the person giving the information owe a duty to the recipient. 7 The

recipient, in turn, must have a right to rely upon the information. 79

Three years later, in Holland v. Lawless,8° the court based its decision
on Stotlar. Holland held that an estate's attorney who made misrepresentations to a purchaser of the estate's land could be liable for negligent
misrepresentation."' The court of appeals found liability possible for

74. Neff v. Bud Lewis Co., 89 N.M. 145, 148, 548 P.2d 107, 110 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 89
N.M. 321, 551 P.2d 1368 (1976).
75. Id.
76. 92 N.M. 26, 29, 582 P.2d 403, 406 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 180, 585 P.2d 324
(1978). The defendant, Hester, appraised a house for the co-defendants, Campbells. Id. at 27, 582
P.2d at 404. The plaintiffs bought the house based upon Hester's appraisal, and the plaintiffs later
sued Hester, claiming that the appraisal was erroneous and negligently done. Id. The district court
granted summary judgment for Hester, and the court of appeals reversed. Id. at 27, 31, 582 P.2d
at 404, 408.
77. Id. at 28, 582 P.2d at 405 (citing Steinberg v. Coda Roberson Constr. Co., 79 N.M. 123,
440 P.2d 798 (1968)). Before Steinberg, the person claiming negligent misrepresentation had to be
in privity of contract with the person making the representation. In other words, a third party to
the transaction could not raise the claim. Steinberg held that privity of contract had no place in
tort law and should not be considered when deciding a case brought under a negligence theory.
Steinberg, 79 N.M. at 124, 440 P.2d at 799.
78. Siolar, 92 N.M. at 28, 582 P.2d at 405. "[Wjhether a duty exists is generally a question
of law for the trial court to decide." R.A. Peck, Inc. v. Liberty Fed. Sav. Bank, 108 N.M. 84,
88, 766 P.2d 928, 932, (Ct. App. 1988).
79. Stotlar, 92 N.M. at 28, 582 P.2d at 405.
80. 95 N.M. 490, 496, 623 P.2d 1004, 1008 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 95 N.M. 593, 624 P.2d
535 (1981).
81. Id. at 497, 623, P.2d at 1011. In Holland, the defendant Schollenbarger was the administrator
of Carlos de Ia Fuente's estate. Id. at 492, 623 P.2d at 1006. Defendant Lawless was the estate's
attorney. Id. The probate court allowed the plaintiff to lease the decedent's residence, which was
in danger of foreclosure. Id. From the discussion plaintiff had with Lawless, the plaintiff believed
that 600/o of his rent payments would be applied to a future purchase of the land for $40,000. Id.
Later, the claim which threatened foreclosure was settled, and a new administrator was appointed.
Id. The plaintiff filed suit against the estate to force the new administrator to sell the residence,
or for damages. Id. The trial court dismissed the complaint. Id. The New Mexico Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that neither Lawless nor Schollenbarger had authority to make the lease and
option to buy. Id. (quoting Matter of Estate of De La Fuente, 93 N.M. 87, 596 P.2d 856 (1979)).
Plaintiff then sued Lawless and Schollenbarger, among others, alleging breach of contract, legal
malpractice, negligence, and negligent misrepresentation. Id. at 492, 623 P.2d at 1006.
The trial court granted all of the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the breach of
contract and legal malpractice claims, saying that the breach of contract claim was res judicata and
that the malpractice claim was not warranted because there was no attorney-client relationship. Id.
The court dismissed the negligence and misrepresentation counts against the attorney because he
owed no duty to the plaintiff without an attorney-client relationship. Id. at 492-93, 623 P.2d at
1006-07. The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling that the attorney owed no duty
to the plaintiff because no attorney-client relationship existed. Id. at 495, 623 P.2d at 1009. Instead,
the attorney represented the estate's administrator. Id. The court of appeals therefore upheld the
lower court's dismissal of the negligence action. Id.
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negligent misrepresentation despite the fact that there was no attorneyclient relationship, and that the attorney owed no duty to the purchaser
because of the attorney-client relationship.12 After quoting extensively
from Stotlar, the court of appeals reaffirmed its adoption of the Restatement.8 3 It then held that the fact finder must determine whether the
attorney's statements to the purchaser concerning the land purchase constituted negligent misrepresentation. " The court remanded the issue, holding that the trier of fact must determine: (1) whether the statements were
false, (2) whether the attorney acted negligently, and (3) the scope of
liability. 8
Unlike Holland, the court in Garcia ruled that the attorney's lack of
duty which precludes liability for negligence also precludes liability for
negligent misrepresentation." While agreeing that privity of contract was
not necessary for negligent misrepresentation, the court found that there
was no reliance on the board members' attorneys' statements because
there can never be justifiable reliance on such statements by an adverse
party.
By holding that attorneys are not liable to their adversaries for negligent
misrepresentation, Garciatakes the matter out of a jury's hands. Although
it appears that Garcia ignores Holland by leaving nothing for the fact
finder, Holland is ignored only if one considers the parties in Holland
to be adversaries. In Holland, the plaintiff was a contracting party, not
an adversary of the estate which Lawless represented. In Garcia, the
parties were in direct opposition by virtue of the adversary process. The
Garcia court was only concerned with an attorney's duty to his client's
adversary.
Still, other than Stotlar and Holland, the Garcia court used only one
case, Bickel v. Mackie,8 8 to support its negligent misrepresentation decision.8 9 Bickel, like most of the decisions upon which Garcia relied,
involved a doctor filing suit against an attorney after the attorney represented a client in suing the doctor for malpractice. 90 Neither Bickel nor
the other decisions cited by Garcia discuss whether an attorney is liable
for negligent misrepresentation when that attorney has made an affirmative

82. Id. at 497, 623 P.2d at 1011.
83. Id. at 496-97, 623 P.2d at 1010-11.
84. Id. at 497, 623 P.2d at 1011. It is unclear where the court found the duty to make the
attorney liable for negligent misrepresentation. Presumably, the court found a duty outside of the
attorney's position as an attorney.
85. Id. Judge Sutin filed a dissenting opinion, but did not question the court's reasoning in

reversing the negligent misrepresentation claim. Instead, he stated that the plaintiff did not allege
negligent misrepresentation, but false representation, which requires the speaking party to intend to
make a false statement. Id. at 500, 623 P.2d at 1014 (Sutin, J., dissenting).
86. Garcia, 106 N.M. at 762, 750 P.2d at 123.
87. Id. (citing Bickel, 447 F. Supp. at 1381).
88. 447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa), affd, 590 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1978).

89. Garcia, 106 N.M. at 761-62, 750 P.2d at 122-23.
90. Bickel. 447 F. Supp. at 1378.
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misstatement of fact. 9' In Holland, the only case that came close to such
a fact pattern, the New Mexico court found the attorney liable.
The court may have ignored the fact that Garcia involved an affirmative

misstatement of fact because it was more concerned with protecting
attorneys, thereby making attorneys unafraid to pursue their clients'

interests. If another case like Garcia arose, and the Garcia court had
allowed liability, attorneys would be hesitant to raise the Eleventh Amend-

ment immunity on appeal, for fear of being made liable. Instead, an
attorney might attempt to defeat an adverse judgment using other more
time-consuming or costly means. If the attorney's client would be adversely

affected by these means, the client would then be forced to bring a
malpractice and disciplinary action, thus consuming more time and court
resources, and making the innocent client pay for the attorney's mistake.
C.

Constructive Fraud and Promissory Estoppel in New Mexico
Although the elements of constructive fraud and promissory estoppel
are different, Garcia struck both theories of recovery because the board's
attorney owed no duty to the plaintiffs. The court did not have to look

outside the jurisdiction to find the elements for either claim, and therefore
quickly dismissed both claims.

1. Constructive Fraud
Constructive fraud is a breach of a legal or equitable duty, irrespective
of the moral guilt of the fraud feasor.9 2 Liability is based on the notion
that if one speaks at all, there is a duty to give reliable information. 3
The court dismissed this claim in two sentences. First, the court noted
that a legal or equitable duty would create a conflict of interest with an
attorney's duty to her client.9 The court then stated that, "as we have
already noted, defense counsel owes no duty to his client's adversary." 95
Garcia's extension of its duty analysis to constructive fraud appears
to be consistent with New Mexico law. To allow liability based upon

91. Misstatements of law are usually not actionable. See, e.g., Cicone v. URS Corp., 183 Cal.
App. 3d 194, 202, 227 Cal. Rptr. 887, 891 (1986).
92. Archuleta v. Kopp, 90 N.M. 273, 276, 562 P.2d 834, 837 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 90
N.M. 636, 567 P.2d 485 (1977). In its original opinion, filed November 23, 1987, the Garcia court
rejected Garcia's constructive fraud claim, stating that to establish constructive fraud, a plaintiff
must show a special confidential or fiduciary relationship between the parties to a transaction.
Garcia v. Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., No. 16,667, slip op. at 9 (Nov. 23, 1987)
(citing Baum v. Great Western Cities, Inc., of New Mexico, 703 F.2d 1197, 1212, (10th Cir. 1983)).
Upon rehearing, the court withdrew the original opinion for the present one. The only change made
was its analysis of constructive fraud. There no longer is a need for a fiduciary relationship to
exist in order to be-liable for constructive fraud, as Garcia had previously ruled. Wolf and Klar
Cos. v. Garner, 101 N.M. 116, 118, 679 P.2d 258, 260 (1984).
93. Archuleta, 90 N.M. at 276, 562 P.2d at 837. "[Acts contrary to public policy, to sound
morals, to the provisions of a statute, etc., however honest the intention with which they may have
been performed, are deemed constructive frauds, or frauds in law, and are absolutely void." Id.
(quoting Leitensdorfer v. Webb, I N.M. (Gild.) 34, 53 (1853). aff'd, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 176 (1858)).
94. Garcia, 106 N.M. at 763, 750 P.2d at 124.
95. Id.
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the standard of conduct given in the New Mexico precedents on constructive fraud would be inconsistent with Rule 11 of the New Mexico
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 11 only requires that the attorney file
the lawsuit in good faith after preliminary research and fact finding. 96
Because constructive fraud does not consider the fraud feasor's moral
guilt, allowing liability would conflict with Rule 1l's good faith standard.
2.

Promissory Estoppel
Garcia quotes Eavenson v. Lewis Means, Inc. , 97 which cites the Restatement (Second) of Contracts in analyzing the elements and "limits"
of promissory estoppel.98 "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee
or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is
binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."99
The "limits" of promissory estoppel are that there must be substantial
.economic loss, foreseeable reliance by the promisor, and justifiable reliance
upon the promise.10
Garcia used its earlier analysis of duty, and the limits of justifiable
reliance and foreseeability to strike Garcia's claim. The court stated that
Garcia could not justifiably rely upon his adversary's attorney's statements
because attorneys have no duty to their clients' adversaries A'1 Nor could
the board's attorneys foresee that Garcia would rely upon their statements. 1o2

Garcia ignores Eavenson's holding that reasonable reliance and foreseeability were fact issues, 03 presumably because of Garcia's implicit
holding that, as a matter of law, a party cannot justifiably or foreseeably

96. Rule II states, in part:

Every pleading or other paper provided for by these rules . .. shall be signed by
at least one .attorney of record ....
The signature of an attorney on any pleading
or other paper provided for by the rules constitutes a certificate by him that he
has read the pleading or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information
and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for
delay.
Sup. CT. RuLas

ANN.

1-011 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).

97. 105 N.M. 161. 730 P.2d 464 (1986). In Eavenson, the plaintiff was a secretary when the
defendant approached her and offered her a job with better pay and benefits. Id. at 162, 730 P.2d
at 465. The defendant also gave her a prospective starting date. Id. Plaintiff accepted the offer
and the defendant acknowledged this acceptance. Id. Plaintiff then quit her job, but the defendant
would not employ her. Id. The court awarded recovery based upon promissory estoppel. Id.
98. 106 N.M. at 763, 750 P.2d at 124.
99. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS §90 (1981).

100. Eavenson, 105 N.M. at 162, 730 P.2d at 465 (quoting L. StMPSON, CONTRACTS (1965)).
Simpson quotes REsTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcrs §90 (1932). Although both the Garcia and Eavenson
courts use the wrong Restatement by using Simpson's quote, and both inadvertently place a "not"
between "does" and "induce," the mistakes make no difference in deciding Garcia. Neither court
reads the "not" into their analysis, while both rely more on Simpson's limits to promissory estoppel,
especially those of reasonable and foreseeable reliance upon the promise.
101. Garcia, 106 N.M. at 763, 750 P.2d at 124.
102. Id.
103. Eavenson, 105 N.M. at 162, 730 P.2d at 465.
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rely upon his adversary's attorney's statements.1N However, in ignoring
Eavenson, the court also appears to act inconsistently with the Garcia
decision itself. The court concludes its decision by stating that remedies
are available for cases such as Garcia.0 1 While no independent cause of
action exists for an attorney's misconduct, "[w]ithin the action out of
which a grievance arises, remedies are provided for the benefit and relief
of parties wronged through reasonable reliance upon misrepresentations
of an adversary's attorney."'0 Although the court does not state what

remedies exist within the action, it would appear in Garcia's case that
reopening the judgment under Rule 60(b) may be possible."" Also, the
court noted that the wronged party can invoke disciplinary proceedings.10a
Although the court states that means exist to redress a grievance within
the proceeding, rather than by bringing an independent action, the court
does not explain why there is a difference between raising a claim of
reasonable reliance within a proceeding using non-pecuniary measures
and raising it in an independent action. The reliance in the first action
is the same, whether it is sued upon in an action for money damages
or in an action for discipline. Further, in Garcia, the plaintiff cannot
seek redress in the same action because all of his actions have been
dismissed. To regain his award, Garcia must try to reopen the judgment
dismissing his claim against the board members in their individual capacities.109 Even if Garcia can reopen the judgment, he will have to retry
the entire case.
D.

Code of Professional Responsibility and the Attorney's Oath
Presently, New Mexico's Rules of Professional Conduct" ° (the "Rules")
provide that violation of the rules invokes the disciplinary process, not
a private cause of action."' Garcia claimed that because the former Code

104. Cf. Eavenson, 105 N.M. at 162, 730 P.2d at 465 and Garcia, 106 N.M. at 763, 750 P.2d
at 124.
105. 106 N.M. at 763, 750 P.2d at 124.
106. Id. (emphasis added).
107. Sup. CT. RuLEs AN.
1-060(b) (1986). Under Rule 60(b)(1-3), Garcia would have had to
bring the motion to reopen within a reasonable time, but no later than one year for: (1) a claim
of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; or (3) fraud,
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party. The judgment can be reopened under
60(b)(4-6) if the motion is made within a reasonable time if: (4) the judgment is void; (5) the
judgment has been satisfied; or (6) any other reason that would justify relief. Id.
108. Garcia, 106 N.M. at 763, 750 P.2d at 124.
109. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
110. Sup. CT. RuLts ANN. 16-101 to -805 (Repl. Pamp. 1988).
111. Sup. CT. Rutns ANN. 16-101 (Scope). The Rules restate the fear that the Rules will be used
as a basis for a retaliatory or antagonistic collateral proceeding by an opposing party to a suit.
Id.; see also, Spencer, 337 So.2d at 600-01. The court in Spencer stated:
This conclusion [to deny liability] is based primarily on the failure of the petition
to allege any facts to support the proposition that defendant's duty under [the
Code of Professional Responsibility] and his oath was designed solely to prevent
the risk of plaintiff's being piqued at being sued. This would be an over simplification
of the ethical complexities which govern the lawyer's conduct to his client, the
court and the public.
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of Professional Responsibility (the "Code") did not contain the Scope
portion presently contained in the Rules, the Code allowed a private
cause of action based upon the Code's provisions. 1 2 The court replied
that the Code was intended to invoke only the disciplinary process, as
evidenced by the court's later adoption of the Scope and Preamble in
the Rules." ' Like a breach of the Rules or Code, a breach of the Attorney's
Oath" 4 (the "Oath") provides only a public, not private, remedy." 5
Garcia tried to analogize a violation of the Code and Oath to negligence
per se actions based upon a breach of statutory duty." 6 The court stated
that statutory liability does not exist unless there is an underlying common
law cause of action." 7 By virtue of its holding on the issues of duty,
negligence, negligent misrepresentation, constructive fraud, and promissory
estoppel, the court found that there was no underlying common law
cause of action to support negligence per se based upon the Code."'
Garcia also noted that allowing liability for breach of the Code or Oath
would inhibit freedom of access to the courts and that "the public can
avail itself of other remedies against unprofessional lawyers. ""11
IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF GARCIA

Garcia puts attorneys on notice that they cannot reasonably rely upon
their adversary's words. Attorneys must presume that they cannot rely
upon any statements made by opposing counsel concerning the opposing
counsel's future actions in representing their clients. The party or attorney

112. Garcia, 106 N.M. at 762, 750 P.2d at 123.
113. Id. Although this decision appears to be hindsight, the court also cited Speer v. Cimosz,
97 N.M. 602, 642 P.2d 205 (Ct. App.), cert. denied sub noma., New Hampshire Insurance Group

v. Speer, 98 N.M. 50, 644 P.2d 1039 (1982), which stated, in dicta, that a violation of the Code
should be referred to the Disciplinary Board rather than a court. Speer, 97 N.M. at 605, 642 P.2d
at 208.
114. Sup. CT. RULEs ANN. 15-304 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
115. Garcia, 106 N.M. at 762, 750 P.2d at 123 (citing Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Elgin
Coal, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 17, 22 (E.D. Tenn. 1972). aff'd, 477 F.2d 598 (6th Cir. 1973)).
116. Garcia, 106.N.M. at 763, 750 P.2d at 124.

117. Id.; see also, Bob Godfrey Pontiac, Inc. v. Roloff, 291 Or. 318, 630 P.2d 840 (1981) (cited
with approval in Garcia, 106 N.M. at 762, 750 P.2d at 123). The Godfrey court, like Garcia,
aecided that there was no underlying common law cause of action in negligence which would make
the breach of the Code negligence per se. Id. at

-,

630 P.2d at 846. The court further found

that, absent an underlying common law cause of action, courts must create a new cause of action
630 P.2d at 845. The Godfrey
if the statute did not indicate whether one was created. Id. at -,
court then held that it could not be certain that the legislature intended the court to create a new
630
cause of action under the Code, so that its breach would be negligence per se. Id. at -,
P.2d at 846. Without this certainty, Godfrey held that courts should err on the side of not creating
630 P.2d at 845. The court further found that a new cause
a new cause of action. Id. at -,
of action was not needed because actions for malicious prosecution are available and give the remedy
630 P.2d at 849.
sought. Id. at -,
118. Garcia, 106 N.M. at 763, 750 P.2d at 124.

119. Id. at 762, 750 P.2d at 123. Garcia does not decide whether an expert may use the Rules
or Code to determine whether an attorney has breached professional standards in a malpractice action.
Although the Rules specifically state that the Rules may not be used as a basis for liability, courts
have allowed experts on the duty of care to use the Rules to define the standards which lawyers
must meet. See, e.g., Miami Int'l Realty Co. v. Paynter, 841 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1988).
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must take appropriate precautions based upon this presumption. In Garcia,
for example, Garcia's attorney would have had to dismiss the action
against the board members without prejudice, until he determined that
the board members' attorneys would not raise the Eleventh Amendment
immunity defense.
Most attorneys, trained in the adversary system, will find the Garcia
holding reasonable and logical. Attorneys will accept the need for precautions as a part of the adversary system and be glad for the protection
it provides. However, Garcia also adds ammunition to the arsenal of
those in the public who view attorneys with contempt. After Garcia,
these persons will only see lawyers as further insulated from the system
they are to uphold. What these persons will fail to realize is that they
and their attorneys benefit from the Garcia holding. Clients can have
confidence that their attorneys are protecting their interests only, instead
of the interests of others. For this reason, the court worries less about
public perception and more about the adversary system that the public
must use.
The board members' attorneys cannot be faulted for protecting their
client's best interest. Garcia holds that they cannot be held liable for
allowing the dismissal based upon their assertions that they would not
raise the immunity. Although the result appears inequitable, the underlying
policy reasons, mentioned above, demonstrate its value.
Garcia protects an adverse party's attorney from liability for any claim
which has duty as one of its elements or involves reliance upon the
attorney's words or conduct. Therefore, the injured party's only recourse
to get monetary damages appears to be an .action for fraud, malicious
prosecution, or abuse of process. The party can turn to the disciplinary
process for vindication. However, vindication is a hollow victory for a
person who has just lost $180,000.120 It is also of little comfort to a
corporation'that has just been subjected to a strike suit, or persons, like
doctors, who have been subjected to nuisance suits.' 2' In Bickel v. Mackie,
the federal court for the Northern District of Iowa stated that the decision
to protect attorneys from liability for their misleading statements is
anomalous and might be unsatisfying because many persons will have
no way to get monetary damages.' - However, the court stated that it
would leave the decision to the Iowa state courts and legislature. 2, The
New Mexico Supreme Court has made its decision.

120. Bob Godfrey, 291 Or. at -,
630 P.2d at 854 (Linde. J., concurring).
121. Bickel, 447 F. Supp. at 1384. A "strike suit" is a term given to lawsuits filed by derivative
shareholders "interested in getting quick dollars by making charges without regard to their truth
so as to coerce corporate managers to settle worthless claims in order to get rid of them." Surowitz
v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 371 (1966). A "nuisance suit" is much like a strike suit in
that the plaintiff is looking for quick dollars. It is brought by plaintiffs in all kinds of lawsuits.
See, e.g.,Bull v. McCuskey, 96 Nev. 706, 615 P.2d 957 (1980).
122. 447 F. Supp. at 1384.
123. Id.
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After Garcia was decided, New Mexico's appellate courts addressed
both banks' 21 and doctors"' 2 liabilities to third parties. Both decisions
expanded these professions' duties to third parties. Although the decision
concerning doctors contained a strong dissent,' 26 both decisions appear
to be consistent with Garcia.
In R.A. Peck, Inc. v. Liberty Federal Savings Bank,' 27 the court of
appeals held that banks may have a duty to disclose a customer's financial
status.'2 The court stated that although banks have a duty not to disclose
a customer's status with the bank,' 2 9 the bank in this instance had this

duty. 130
The court set up a two-step process to determine whether the bank
had a duty to disclose the customer's financial status. First, the court
determined whether there was a relation between the plaintiff and the
bank which would create the duty to disclose.' 3 ' The court stated that
the relation exists:
1. Where-there is a previous definite fiduciary relation between the
parties.
2. Where it appears one or each of the parties to the contract
expressly reposes a trust and confidence in the other.
3. Where the contract or transaction is intrinsically fiduciary and
calls for perfect good
faith. The contract of insurance is an example
132
of this last class.

Without elaboration, the court held that the bank's actions placed it in
category 2.' 33 If this relation exists, the court stated that, under special
circumstances, 3 the
court may hold the bank liable for non-disclosure to
4
a third party.'

124. R.A. Peck, Inc. v. Liberty Fed. Say. Bank, 108 N.M. 84, 766 P.2d 928 (Ct. App. 1988).
125. Wilschinsky v. Medina, 108 N.M. 511, 775 P.2d 713 (1989).
126. Id. at 518, 775 P.2d at 720 (Scarborough, J., dissenting).
127. 108 N.M. 84, 766 P.2d 928 (Ct. App. 1988).
128. 108 N.M. at 86, 766 P.2d at 930. The plaintiff was a contractor building a ski lodge for
the bank's customer. Id. at 87, 766 P.2d at 931. The plaintiff was to be paid out of the funds
loaned by the bank to the customer. Id. When the customer did not pay the plaintiff, the bank
told plaintiff to submit pay requests to the bank. Id. The plaintiff kept building based upon the
bank's instructions and assurances of payment. Id. By December of 1984, all loan funds had been
disbursed, including some disbursements outside the scope of the loan agreement. Id. When the
plaintiff submitted a pay request in March of 1985, the bank refused to pay because the loan funds
were depleted. Id. The plaintiff sued the bank for fraud, constructive fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. Id. at 86, 766 P.2d at 930. The trial court dismissed for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted, and the plaintiff appealed. Id.
129. 108 N.M. at 89, 766 P.2d at 933.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. Apparently, the court based its holding on the notion that the bank had thrust itself
into the transaction through its instructions. By doing so, the bank had become more than a money
lender. See, id. at 91, 766 P.2d at 935.
134. Id. at 90, 766 P.2d at 934. The special circumstances" include:
(a) One who speaks must say enough to prevent his words from misleading the
other party.
(b) One who has special knowledge of material facts to which the other party
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The Garcia facts do not lend themselves to any of the three categories
establishing a relationship giving rise to a duty. There was no "previous
definite fiduciary relation" between Garcia and Rodey. According to the
Garcia court, Garcia could not repose any trust in his adversary's attorney.
By no means is an adversarial relationship intrinsically fiduciary. Because
no relationship giving rise to a duty existed, the court's special circumstances test for banks would not be applicable. Not even a bank would
be put to the special circumstances test until the duty test was met.
Therefore, Peck appears to be inapplicable to attorneys because attorneys
owe no duty to adverse parties under either the Garcia or Peck duty
tests.
In Wilschinsky v. Medina,'35 the supreme court held that doctors have
a duty to third parties under certain circumstances. At first glance,
distinguishing Wilschinsky from Garcia appears to be more difficult than
distinguishing Peck. In Wilschinsky, the plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident by a doctor's patient after the doctor injected the
patient with drugs that affected the patient's ability to drive.'3 6 The
plaintiff brought suit in the United States District Court, but the United
States District Court certified three questions to the New Mexico Supreme
Court. The court defined the issue narrowly as "whether a doctor owes
a duty to third parties from treatment of an outpatient when the doctor
has given the patient an injection of drugs that could clearly impair the
38
patient's ability to reason and to operate an automobile."'
Wilschinsky determined the doctor's duty by examining "the likelihood
of injury, the reasonableness of the burden of guarding against it, and
the consequences of burdening the defendant.'

1

9

The court found that

does not have access may have a duty to disclose these facts to the other party.
(c) One who stands in a confidential or fiduciary relation to the other party to
a transaction must disclose material facts.
Id. The court also noted that "a bank may have a duty to disclose financial information concerning
a depositor if a bank had actual knowledge that its customer is committing fraud." Id.
135. 108 N.M. 511, 775 P.2d 713 (1989).
136. 108 N.M. at 512, 775 P.2d at 714. The doctor injected the patient with Meperidine and
then either Vistaril or Tigan after the patient had taken Percodan. Id. Within approximately 70
minutes after the first injection, the patient had the accident. Id.
137. Id. The questions certified were:
I. Does the legal duty of a physician practicing in New Mexico to use reasonable
care in treating a patient extend only to the patient or also to others who may
foreseeably be harmed by the physician's negligent treatment of the patient?
2. If the legal duty extends to others in addition to the patient, what is the
nature and extent of the duty owed to the plaintiffs in this case?
3. If the legal duty extends to others in addition to the patient, does the New
Mexico Medical Malpractice Act . .. [N.M.S.A. 1978, §§41-5-1 to 41-5-28 (Repl.
Pamp. 1986)] apply to claims based on malpractice asserted by non-patients against
a physician who is qualified under the provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act?
Id.
138. Id. at 514, 775 P.2d at 716. The court went to great lengths to explain that the issue was
not: (1) a doctor's "duty to control a patient with known dangerous propensities;" id. at 513, 775
P.2d at 715; (2) a doctor's "duty to warn specific, identifiable third parties;" id. at 514, 775 P.2d
at 716; or (3) a doctor's liability for negligently prescribed drugs; id.
139. Id. at 513, 515, 775 P.2d at 715, 717 (citing Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Medical Center,
117 Ill. 2d 507, 526, 513 N.E.2d 387, 396 (1987)). See supra note 45 and accompanying text for
the factors used in determining negligence.

Summer 19901

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

the likelihood of injury was high; that based upon standards of normal
medical practice, it is not unreasonable to make the doctor carry the
burden of guarding against the danger; and that "if the scope of the
doctor's duty is limited to the professional standards of acceptable medical
practice, the additional burden on the doctor's treatment decisions is
negligible.' "40 The court made a point of stating that the doctor's duty
only extends to persons injured under facts similar to those in Wilschinsky.14 ' The duty does not apply "to the entire public for any injuries
' 14
suffered for which an argument of causation can be made. "

Justice Scarborough dissented because, among other reasons, he felt
that the court should not hold doctors liable to third parties in light of
Garcia.143 Justice Scarborough stated that "[t]his court in Garcia v. Rodey
was not prepared to extend the legal duty of an attorney to non-client
thir[d] parties who may be injured by the services or advice of the
attorney to this [sic] client."'" He therefore would have ruled not to
extend a doctor's liability to third party non-patients.
The majority replied to Justice Scarborough by stating that it was not
determining whether there was malpractice, but merely holding that the
duty of a doctor is based on malpractice standards.4 5 The court specifically
distinguished Garciaby stating that Garcia "specifically weighed the harm
suffered by the litigant against the policy of holding lawyers to a single
standard of behavior."''
"Here, however, we have defined the doctor's
duty in terms of medical standards already in place.'

' 47

The court stressed,

as in Garcia, that lawyers must zealously represent their clients and to
allow liability to third party adversaries would create a conflict of interest. 1 The court also noted that attorneys are liable to third parties
9
in will drafting and examination of title cases. 1
Justice Ransom specially concurred in the opinion "to express chagrin
that seeds of further interprofessional discord needlessly may be sewn
[sic] by certain language in the dissent."' 50 He stressed that the court
decided Garcia in the context of an adversary proceeding. 5 ' He also
quoted the portion of Garcia that stated that third parties may redress

140. Id. at 515, 775 P.2d at 717. The court also noted that the burden was reasonable because
it falls under the Medical Malpractice Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§41-5-1 to -28 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
Id. at 515-18, 775 P.2d at 717-20. The court found that "the legislature intended [the Medical
Malpractice Act] to cover all causes of action arising in New Mexico that are based on acts of
malpractice." Id.at 517, 775 P.2d at 719.
141. Id. at 515, 775 P.2d at 717.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 518-20, 775 P.2d at 720-22 (Scarborough, J., dissenting). Justice Scarborough also
felt that there were not enough facts to grant certiorari or to resolve the issue. Id. at 519-20, 775
P.2d at 721-22.
144. Id.at 519, 775 P.2d at 721 (Scarborough, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 515, 775 P.2d at 717.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.; see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
150. Id. at 518, 775 P.2d at 720 (Ransom, J., specially concurring).
151. Id.
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their grievances in the proceeding if the party is "wronged through
52
reasonable reliance upon misrepresentations of an adversary's attorney.'9
Justice Ransom also stated that "[i]t is certainly no extension of the
liability burden of physicians under tort law to say that a doctor has a
duty to refrain from optional outpatient administration of mind altering
medication that, under the circumstances, gives rise to an unreasonable
risk of injury to others.""'
Justice Scarborough's only reason for refusing to extend a doctor's
3 4 However, as
liability was that the court refused to do so in Garcia.'
the Wilschinsky majority pointed out, the Garcia court accepted a lawyer's
liability to third-party beneficiaries of the lawyer's work.'" To use this
analogy, however, the majority would have to consider the injured party
as a third-party beneficiary of the doctor's actions in keeping the patient
off the roads. Because the court would not allow a duty to extend to
the general public, 5 6 this analogy does not distinguish Wilschinsky from
Garcia.
Instead, the distinguishing factor appears to be the adversarial setting
and the conflict of interest that would arise from a co-existing duty to
a client and that client's adversary. The fact that the doctor in Wilschinsky
had a duty to those injured by his patient after the injection did not
affect his treatment of the patient in any way. In fact, the duty will
probably insure that he treats the patient in such a way as to injure
nobody, including the patient. By contrast, an attorney who has a duty
to his client's adversary may act in a manner detrimental to the client.
The attorney may not zealously promote her client's cause for fear of
incurring personal liability. Therefore, Wilschinsky is both distinguishable
from and consistent with Garcia.
As Justice Ransom noted in Wilschinsky, the Wilschinsky decision may
increase claims that lawyers work under a double standard from other
members of the public. Members of the public may not attempt to
distinguish Garcia from the cases which followed, adding even more stains
on attorneys' public images. The American Bar Association ("ABA")
has expressed an increased concern with this public image. 5 , "[A]ccording
to a wide range of observers, . . . the image of lawyers today ranges
somewhere between 'poor' and 'not much worse than before.""" 8 Further
exacerbating the problem is the fact that lawyers disagree among themselves as to what is ethical conduct and what a lawyer's liability should
be as compared to other professions.5 9 According to Monroe Freedman,

152. Id. (quoting Garcia, 106 N.M. at 763. 750 P.2d.at 124). See supra note 106 and accompanying
text.
153. Wilschinsky, 108 N.M. at 518, 775 P.2d at 720 (Ransom, J., specially concurring).
154. See supra notes 143-144 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
157. See Public Image of Lawyers, 74 A.B.A. J. 46-66 (November 1988).
158. See Jost, What Image Do We Deserve?, 74 A.B.A. J. 47 (November 1988).
159. Id. Wilschinsky is an example of disagreement over a lawyer's liability to third persons as
compared to doctors' liability. See supra notes 136-53 and accompanying text.
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the biggest problem with lawyers' public images is that nobody has spoken
directly to the public about a lawyer's duties. 60
In response to these concerns, the ABA has proposed two model creeds
of professionalism and has suggested that state Bar associations adopt
creeds of professionalism.1 61 Some individual firms have already adopted
creeds for their firms.1 62 Other suggestions include opinion-editorial articles, television appearances, and school programs.' 63 However, according
to some attorneys, more than public information is needed.'"
[T]his prescription for a better image would rely on concrete actions,
like speeding up trials, pushing harder for cheaper ways of settling
disputes or handling routine legal transactions, and increasing pro
bono work without being forced to by the courts.
It would tell the bar to stop worrying about problems only lawyers
care about-like distasteful advertising or unseemly publicity-seekingand save its energy for real problems, like speaking up for unpopular
advocates, getting tougher with unethical
lawyers, and implementing
16
some real reforms in the legal system. 1
The New Mexico Board of Bar Commissioners
public image campaign by adopting a Creed
"Creed").'6 Violation of the Creed will bring no
is intended to be self-motivating and to provide

has started its improved
of Professionalism (the
sanctions. 67 "The Creed
aspirational goals which

the members of the Bar would voluntarily seek to achieve.'

' 6

9

Instead

of disciplining attorneys, the Creed punishes attorneys who fall below
its standards by subjecting the attorney to "the condemnation of the
Bar in general.'

' 69

According to the New Mexico Board of Bar Com-

missioners, "[u]nlike the Rules of Professional Conduct, which established
the minimum standards by which an attorney must conduct a client's
business, the Creed sets higher standards or goals, which no attorney
may satisfy in every instance, but which 70 will guide and influence professional behavior throughout the Bar."'

The Board of Bar Commissioners has gone further in promoting lawyers'
images by forming the Public and Community Relations Committee (the
"Committee").' 7' This Committee is taking steps to meet Monroe Freed-

160. Jost, supra note 158, at 47.
161. ABA Recommends Creeds for Bar Associations, 75 A.B.A. J. 58 (January 1989); Jost, supra
note 158, at 51.
162. Gering, Law Firms Adopt Credos, 75 A.B.A. J. 56 (January 1989).
163. Jost, supra note 158, at 51.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See State Bar Adopts Creed of Professionalism, 28 N.M. St. B. Bull. I (March 16, 1989).
167. Id.
168. Letter from The State Bar of New Mexico Board of Bar Commissioners to All Members
of the State Bar of New Mexico (May 1, 1989) ("Letter") (enclosing a copy of the Creed).
169. 28 N.M. St. B. Bull., supra note 166, at 4.
170. Letter, supra note 168.
171. See State Bar Committee Works to Improve Public Understanding of the Profession, 28
N.M. St. B. Bull. 1 (March 9, 1989).
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man's complaint that nobody is speaking to the public about the lawyer's
role in society.' 72 The Committee is presenting seminars for journalists
about the Bar and the legal profession.'7 The relations committee "hopes
a successful seminar will lead to an ongoing cooperative project between
the Bar and the media on an even larger scale."'174 While the Committee
appears to be making strides to meet Freedman's concerns, it remains
to be seen whether the Creed will meet the Bar's other concerns.' 7
V.

CONCLUSION

The Garcia court held, in a case of first impression, that an attorney
cannot be liable to the attorney's adversary for negligence, constructive
fraud, or negligent misrepresentation. The basis for this decision is that
attorneys owe no duty to their adversaries. Moreover, because litigants
cannot justifiably rely on an adverse party's attorney's words, a disappointed litigant cannot bring an action for promissory estoppel. In addition, the Rules of Professional Responsibility, and the Attorney's Oath
do not have underlying common law causes of action in negligence and
cannot be used independently to support liability to the adverse party.
After Garcia, attorneys must be more cautious in pursuing their clients'
claims and in their negotiations with opposing counsel. However, despite
possible adverse affects on the public image of lawyers, the Garcia court
has helped preserve an attorney's ability to zealously and effectively
advocate a client's position.
MATTHEW T. BYERS
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